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This paper provides a theoretical framework to explain why governments
seek restrictions on IPR protection and allow R&D subsidies through
multilateral trade agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement and the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. After 7 years of discussion, the
Uruguay Round extends GATT’s trade-liberalizing philosophy to worldwide
use of subsidies as a secondary means to intervene in international trade.
Through the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures the WTO
tries to preserve one of basic principles of GATT’s philosophy: Fair Competition.
The principle of Fair Competition is of particular importance in understanding
the WTO. To harness GATT’s trade liberalizing philosophy, the WTO as a
successor of GATT takes this principle as objectives that are pursued through
the enforcement and implementation of other principles, for instance the non-
discrimination and reciprocity. As an example of the fair competition principle,
the WTO prohibited any type of export subsidies through the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, but allowed R&D subsidies. The
allowance of R&D subsidies by the WTO is a puzzle because it is well known
that R&D subsidization forms the prisoners’ dilemma when governments are
active to set R&D policy. In order to find any reasonable logic to explain this
puzzle, we focus on the interaction between strategic trade policy tools: R&D
subsidization and IPR protection. Indeed, at an international level IPR
protection has been a major focus of negotiations along with R&D subsidies. The
WTO also requires member countries to strongly enforce patent protection
through the TRIPS Agreement. In our analysis, it turns out that it is globally
optimal to perfectly disseminate knowledge without IPR protection and to
subsidize inventive firms by solving a problem that the weak IPR protection4
damages firms’ incentive to invest in R&D activities. However, current trade
agreements do not match with our global optimum. We show that exporting
countries may benefit – at the expense of importers – from a trade agreement to
demand stronger enforcement on IPR protection because exporting countries
experience the prisoner’s dilemma problem when both countries free ride on
the rival firm’s R&D outcome. Therefore we conclude that it is possible to
understand the TRIPS Agreement as an inefficient victory of the interests of
northern exporting countries over those of southern importing countries.
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Trade Policy Mix under the WTO:7
Protection of TRIPS and R&D Subsidies
Moonsung Kang
I.  Introduction
This paper provides a theoretical framework to explain why governments
seek restrictions on IPR protection and allow R&D subsidies through reciprocal
trade agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement and the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. We explore the implications of our
findings in  my  previous  work for understanding and interpreting these
international agreements by considering R&D subsidies and IPR protection in
tandem. After 7 years of discussion, the Uruguay Round extends GATT’s trade-
liberalizing philosophy to worldwide use of subsidies as a secondary means to
intervene in international trade. Through the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures the WTO tries to preserve one of basic principles of
GATT’s philosophy:  fair competition. The principle of  fair competition is of
particular importance in understanding the WTO. To harness GATT’s trade
liberalizing philosophy, the WTO as a successor of GATT takes this principle as8
objectives that are pursued through the enforcement and implementation of
other principles, for instance the non-discrimination and reciprocity. As an
example of the fair competition principle, the WTO prohibited any type of export
subsidies through the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
but allowed R&D subsidies. The allowance of R&D subsidies by the WTO is a
puzzle because it is known that R&D subsidization forms the prisoners’
dilemma when governments are active to set R&D policy. Brander (1995)
showed that while each country has an incentive to subsidize its domestic R&D
activities, countries are worse off in case that their governments are active to set
R&D policy than in case of free trade. This paper provides a theoretical
framework to explain the allowance of R&D subsidies in the context of an
imperfectly competitive international market where countries set R&D policy
and IPR policy in tandem as strategic trade policy tools.
Based on the results from the previous work,  Patent Infringement and
Strategic Trade Policies, we focus on the interaction between strategic trade
policy tools: R&D subsidization and IPR protection. We realized that in reality
the IPR protection is not perfect and the IPR regime is itself a policy choice that
in principle may affect firms’ incentive to engage in R&D activities to the same
extent that the choice of an R&D subsidy affects these incentives. Indeed, at an
international level IPR protection has been a major focus of negotiations along9
with R&D subsidies. Thus we will consider optimal choices for these policy tools
in tandem rather than examining R&D subsidies in isolation. For IPR protection,
the WTO requires member countries to strongly enforce patent protection
through the TRIPS Agreement. It requires member countries to make patents
available for any inventions in all fields of technology without discrimination. It
is also required that patents be available and patent rights enjoyable for 20 years
without discrimination as to the place of invention and whether products are
imported or locally produced. This paper also provides an answer to understand
why governments seek international standards on patent protection
enforcement.
 It is well known that R&D activity has the public good nature: (1) its
stock does not diminish with its consumption and (2) after invention, the
marginal cost of an additional use is almost zero. For the optimal allocation of
resources, we need to consider several things. From a simple efficiency
perspective, knowledge needs to have a zero price, but with a zero price for
knowledge investors have no pecuniary incentive to invest in R&D activities.
Patents grant an inventor a temporary monopoly over the use of the invention
or the reproduction of a work, and prevent competitors from sharing or using
their knowledge without payments. However, the degree of IPR protection
afforded to innovations has an impact on inventors’ profits and therefore one
the amount of money invested in R&D activities. Keeping in mind the10
interdependence and the trade-off between the need for monopoly and the
benefits of free access to knowledge, we could verify that R&D subsidization
could be a means to cure the damaged incentives of inventor due to weak
enforcement on IPR protection. This is an answer to the question of why the
WTO allows R&D subsidies even though they could have a general form of the
prisoners’ dilemma. To preserve a globally optimal R&D investment level,
governments could use R&D subsidies by curing the damaged incentives to
invest in R&D activities. However, the TRIPS Agreement is hard to understand
because the world as a whole benefits from weaker enforcement on IPR
protection provided R&D subsidies cure the damaged incentives for firms to
invest in R&D activities. Since the globally optimal R&D investment is achieved
through R&D subsidization, the TRIPS Agreement could be useless for global
optimum. However, it is possible that stronger enforcement would be attractive
to exporting countries. Weak enforcement in an exporting country will damage
a foreign rival firm’s incentive to invest in R&D activities. As a consequence of
this negative externality, exporting countries experience the prisoners’ dilemma
problem when both countries free ride on the rival firm’s R&D outcome. This
implies that exporting countries may benefit  – at the expense of importers  –
from a trade agreement to demand stronger enforcement on IPR protection.
Thus it is possible to understand the TRIPS Agreement as an inefficient victory11
of the interests of northern exporting countries over the interests of southern
importing countries.
To show these results, we begin by showing that the Nash equilibrium is
not efficient. The global inefficiency comes from (1) public good nature of R&D
activities and (2) strategic externalities that have arisen in the government-level
game. As we have discussed before, R&D activity has public good natures. Based
on these natures, incentives to invest in R&D activities are easy to be damaged if
the outcome is not perfectly protected. That is why firms are looking for a
chance to free ride on rivals’ R&D outcome. Secondly, government has an
incentive to manipulate strategic relationship between firms in an imperfectly
competitive international market by providing subsidies. However, the
intervention based on strategic policy forms the prisoners’ dilemma, which
results in global inefficiency. Therefore we must take account of the global
inefficiency to answer to the puzzle of the R&D subsidy allowance. To see the
global optimum, we assume that countries cooperate over trade policies to
maximize the worldwide welfare including exporting and importing countries’
welfare. As an alternative, we will check a possibility where exporting countries
cooperate over trade policy tools. This optimization problem explains how
reciprocal trade agreements are attractive to exporting countries comparing to
the global optimum.12
A major hurdle in the multilateral trade negotiations of the Uruguay
Round was how non-tariff barriers (NTBs) should be controlled. Thus IPR
protection became a new area of concern in GATT negotiations, and in the
negotiation some leading countries have demanded strong protection for their
own industries from other countries that consistently violate trade provisions
through the TRIPS Agreement. It was natural that during the Uruguay Round
this issue was very critical between North and South countries forming a north-
south confrontation. Industrial countries, led by the United States, sought a
comprehensive agreement on standards for IPR protection. This demand was of
great concern to many developing countries. Led by India, Brazil, Egypt,
Argentina, and Yugoslavia, they hoped to draw a firm distinction between work
on trade in counterfeit goods and that on TRIPS more broadly defined.
However, the final conclusion of the multilateral negotiations was to require
member countries (1) to make patents available for any inventors in all fields of
technology without discrimination1 and (2) to strongly enforce IPR protection
even though the TRIPS Agreement allowed long transition periods during
which developing countries are supposed to come into compliance with
increased protection for IPR: a ten-year grace period. Extending GATT’s trade-
liberalizing philosophy to IPR protection through the TRIPS Agreement, the
                                                
1  For instance, in India no patents were provided at all for pharmaceutical products
before the multilateral negotiations.13
WTO makes it possible to harmonize patent laws and patent protection
enforcement being a source of international legal convergence toward U.S.
standards of protection.2, 3
In trying to meet those objectives, this paper basically grafts two past
research lines together: strategic trade policy and TRIPS. First, a large number of
papers have focused on strategic R&D policy after a pioneer work by Spencer
and Brander (1983, hereafter SB) who showed that an exporting country has an
incentive to subsidize domestic R&D investment. Even though Eaton and
Grossman (1986) have pointed out that the SB’s result in case of export subsidies
is sensitive to the mode of competition: price or quantity, Bagwell and Staiger
(1994) showed that R&D choices are strategic substitutes regardless of the
competition mode for the case of stochastic R&D effect on cost. Additionally
Maggi (1996) has endogenized the mode of competition introducing capacity
constraints. Based on our motivation of this paper, we extend this research line
by analyzing the interaction between this trade policy mix: patent protection
                                                                                                                                                 
2 The duration of a patent under the WTO has been standardized to a minimum of 20
years from the date of filing. However, it was 17 years from the date of issuance under the US
patent laws. Since it usually takes 2-3 years to issue patents, GATT’s requirement is roughly
equivalent to US duration. However, under the amended provision (which took effect June 8,
1995) the term is 20 years from the application. See US Code: Title 35, Section 154 – (a).
3  However, the convergence can be extremely slow due to long transition periods during
which developing countries are supposed to come into compliance with increased protection
for IPR: a ten-year grace period. See Article 66.1 of TRIPS Agreement.14
enforcement and R&D subsidies. Furthermore, this paper extends the discussion
to the WTO framework. In the absence of any binding agreement, each
government chooses an optimal enforcement level, which maximizes its
domestic welfare. However, after being a member of the WTO, each
government needs to enforce patent protection at the minimum level, which is
required by the TRIPS Agreement. Given the above analysis, we describe the
optimal R&D policy in both regimes.
As a pioneer work of the second research line, Chin and Grossman (1988)
examined the effect of IPRs protection on R&D incentives and social welfare by
using a simple north-south model. Diwan and Rodrik (1991) introduced the
difference of technological needs and tastes between the north and the south.
Extending this research line, Taylor (1993) examined how a reduction in
southern patent protection raises northern incentives to other barriers to
imitations. Additionally Taylor (1994) explored the link between IPR protection
and growth by considering the ability of firms to transfer technologies.
Incorporating the subsidy issue into this research line, this paper sheds light on
the effect of IPR protection on R&D policy. Moreover, this paper takes steps
further than the above work, focusing on trade agreements and exploring the
effect of international legal harmonization.
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The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II establishes an
extended theoretical model from Spencer and Brander (1983), which enables us
to consider R&D subsidies and IPR policy in tandem. Section  III describes in
detail the TRIPS Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, and then in Section IV we provide a theory for both
agreements and analyze the interaction between these agreements. Section V
then concludes.
II. The Model
A. An Extended SB Model to Analyze the Trade Policy Mix
We extend the SB model to a modified one that was presented in my
previous work in order to analyze a trade policy mix: R&D subsidies and
protection of TRIPS under the WTO. This setup contrasts with Spencer and
Brander (1983) that analyzes R&D subsidization considering it as a single trade
policy tool. There are two exporting countries, home (no *) and foreign (*), and a
third importing country. We assume that each exporting country has a single
exporting firm. Both exporting firms play in a two-stage game where firms16
choose R&D levels in the first stage, and in the second stage, output levels. The
policy choices are considered in several ways. First, the government of one
country is allowed to set simultaneously R&D and IPR policy tools in the Nash
setup. Secondly, both home and foreign countries cooperate over the policy mix.
Finally we explore policy choices from the world point of view. The first two
cases are the same as Spencer and Brander (1983), but we will consider R&D
subsidies and IPR policy together.
The idea of backward induction helps to find a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Thus we start by solving for the optimal choice of firms over each
possible situation, and then work backward to compute the optimal choice for
the players before. Then the equilibrium output levels will be calculated in the
last stage, R&D levels in the second stage, and the optimal policy in the first
stage. Now let us begin by analyzing the last stage in order to find a subgame
perfect equilibrium. A domestic firm produces output y at cost C, which induces
all costs except R&D, and earns revenue R. The R&D level of this domestic firm
is denoted x and costs v per unit. The government provides R&D subsidies (tax if
negative) at a rate of s. Profit of this firm is then given as follows:
(1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x s v x x y C y y R s x x y y - - - = q q p *, , , * , , *; , *, , .17
Following Spencer and Brander (1983), outputs y and y* are substitutes
and it is assumed that an increase in the domestic output decreases the marginal
revenue of the foreign firm:
(2)  0 Ry > ;  0 R * y < ;  0 R * yy < .
The production cost of the domestic firm depends on domestic output level as
well as domestic R&D level:  ( ) ( ) q q *, , *, , , x x yc x x y C = , where  ( ) • c  is marginal
cost. This model is similar to Qiu and Tao (1998), except that we introduce
patent protection enforcement. It is assumed that an increase in the foreign
R&D activities also reduces the domestic firm’s marginal cost if home country is
weakly enforcing patent protection. It implies that the patent granted to the
foreign firm is not protected in the home country. Each firm has the following
marginal cost:
(3)  ( ) ( ) ( ) * *, , x c x c x x c
2 1 q a q + + ” ;
(4)  ( ) ( ) ( ) x * c * * x * c * , x *, x * c
2 1 q a q + + ” ,
where a is sufficiently large so that marginal cost is non-negative for all R&D
investment levels. Let q and q* be patent protection enforcement levels of home18
and foreign countries, respectively. They are defined between 0 and 1. The
home country’s government is perfectly enforcing patent protection if q = 0,
while it enforces nothing and hence the domestic firm can freely copy the
foreign firm’s R&D if q = 1. We make assumptions on marginal cost function as
follows:
(5)  0 c , c




x < ;  0 ,
* 2
* *
1 > x x xx c c .4
When home country is weakly enforcing patent protection, the foreign R&D
activities could affect the domestic firm’s marginal cost in the same way that
the domestic R&D does.
The Nash equilibrium output levels maximizing profits are characterized
by the first order condition:  ( ) ( ) 0 x x c y y Ry y = - = q p *, , * ,  and the second order
condition:  0 Ryy yy < = p . Then the equilibrium output levels are a function of
both home and foreign R&D activities:  ( ) * , *, , q q x x q y =  and  ( ) * , *, , * * q q x x q y = .
However, the effects of each R&D activity on output levels depend on each
country’s patent protection enforcement level:
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where  0 R R R R A
*
* y * y * yy
*
* y * y yy > - ” .5 It turns out that domestic (foreign) R&D
activities are always good for domestic (foreign) output level. However, home
(foreign) R&D activities are good for foreign (home) output if foreign (home)
country’s patent protection enforcement level is greater than a critical level:
yy * yy 1 R R l ” . The equilibrium output levels are also dependent on each
country’s patent protection enforcement level. This is because a country’s IPR
policy would affect how much an increase in a foreign rival’s R&D investment
reduces the domestic firm’s marginal cost. Using the similar method to find (6)



















                                                
5  Totally differentiating the first order conditions and using Cramer’s rule, we can show























Given R&D investment levels of both firms, weak enforcement in the home
country is good (bad) for home (foreign) production, while weak enforcement
in the foreign country is bad (good) for home (foreign) production.
At the second stage, both firms choose R&D levels in order to maximize
their own profits:  ( ) ( ) q p q q , *, , *, , * , , *, , s x x q q s x x G ”  and
( ) ( ) * *, *, , *, , * * , *, *, , * q p q q s x x q q s x x G ” . Now the equilibrium R&D levels are a
function of the trade policy mix:  ( ) * , *, s , s z x q q =  and  ( ) * , *, s , s * z * x q q = . The
key difference between this modification and the SB model is a strategic
relationship between home and foreign R&D activities. While they are strategic
substitutes in the SB setup, the relationship in this modification depends on
both countries’ patent protection enforcement levels. If they are weakly
enforcing, home and foreign R&D activities are strategic complements rather
than substitutes, by implying that signs of  * zz G  and 
*
z * z G  depend on q and q*.6
This dependence implies that both exporting countries are able to manipulate
the strategic relationship between home and foreign R&D activities by setting
enforcement policy of TRIPS protection.
                                                
6  See Proposition 2 and Appendix A in my previous work, Patent Protection and Strategic
Trade Policy.21











































































where  0 G G G G B
*
x * x * xx
*
* x * x xx > - ”  as a stability condition. Each country’s IPR
policy determines the strategic relationship between home and foreign R&D
investment levels  ( )
*
* *, x x xx G G . Under the weakly enforced patent protection
regime, home and foreign R&D levels are strategic complements ( ) 0 G G x x xx >
*
* *, .
The domestic R&D subsidies are always good for the domestic R&D
activities, while the foreign R&D activities could benefit from the domestic R&D
subsidies when home and foreign R&D activities are strategic complements due
to the weak enforcement by home country. Strong enforcement of home
country is always good for the foreign R&D activities because the foreign R&D
                                                
7  See Propositions 3 and 4 in Patent Protection and Strategic Trade Policy.22
outcome is protected in home country. However, the effect of domestic
enforcement level on domestic R&D activities depends on strategic relationship
between home and foreign R&D activities.
It turns out that the foreign (home) country’s weak IPR policy is bad for
the domestic (foreign) firm’s R&D investment because weak enforcement
damages firms’ incentive to invest in R&D activities. The intuition on this
relationship is simple: Under the strong enforcement regime, government could
help its national firm by a little bit weakly enforcing patent protection because
weak enforcement in a country will damage the foreign rival firm’s incentive to
invest in R&D activities and hence alter strategic relationship between firms. On
the other hand, however, weak enforcement will enlarge the free-rider problem
for its domestic firm. Under the weak enforcement regime, weaker enforcement
will damage its domestic firm’s R&D investment by allowing it to freely copy
the rival’s R&D outcome. Thus this effect forms a U-shaped graph implying a
trade-off between a strategic advantage and a free-rider problem.23
B. Non-Cooperative Policy Choices without any Binding
Agreement
We first characterize the non-cooperative Nash policy choices without
any binding agreement. Then we can define the following game:
The game without any binding agreement in the Nash setup
(Stage I) Governments: (1) patent protection enforcement levels
 (2) R&D subsidy rates
(Stage II) Firms: R&D levels
(Stage III) Firms: Output levels
Since we’ve analyzed the last two stages in the previous subsection, we focus
on the first stage in the current subsection. When governments do not cooperate
over policies, home government unilaterally set the trade policy mix to
maximize its domestic welfare:
(P1)
q , s
max   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) * , *, s , s sz , s , * , *, s , s * z , * , *, s , s z G * *, s ; , s W q q q q q q q q q - =
subject to 0 1 £ £ q .





( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) * , *, s , s * z * s * *, s , * , *, s , s * z , * , *, s , s z * G , s *; *, s * W q q q q q q q q q - =
subject to  1 * 0 £ £q .
Since the main result of these optimization problems are identical to that of my
previous work, Patent Infringement and Strategic Trade Policies, we report here the
key aspects of them as follows:































* * q q .
This equilibrium implies that each exporting government has an incentive to
allow its national firm to copy the rival’s R&D investment  ( ) 0
N N > = * q q  and
to subsidize its domestic R&D ( ) 0 s s
N N > = *  in the Nash setup. Notice that the
Nash enforcement level is greater than the critical level of positive externalities:
l2. When we assume that the demand for the final good is linear, this critical
                                                
8  See Appendix A in my previous work, Patent Infringement and Strategic Trade Policies.25
level is equal to the critical level of strategic relationship, l1, at ½. Therefore in
the Nash setup both governments are weakly enforcing patent protection,
making both home and foreign R&D activities strategic complements.
Additionally both R&D activities give rise to positive externalities to the rival’s
profits. On the other hand, this Nash R&D subsidy rate is lower than the Nash
rate without consideration of TRIPS issue in the SB model. It implies that each
exporting country has a strong incentive to be a free rider on the rival’s R&D
and it prefers  “looking the other way” to subsidizing its R&D investment.
Intuitively, by weakly enforcing patent protection the government could help
its national firm at the relatively lower cost, while R&D subsidization needs
financial support.
The “biased” trade policy preference in the Nash equilibrium stems from
the public-good nature of R&D activities: (1) its stock does not diminish with its
consumption and (2) after invention, the marginal cost of an additional use is
almost zero. That is why each country has an incentive to be a free rider on the
rival’s R&D outcome. Additionally it could be also due to the absence of
domestic competition. If we introduce domestic competition, then the
government will enforce more strongly at the Nash equilibrium than in case
without it.9 For simplicity, we keep assuming that there is no domestic
                                                
9  Suppose there are N firms in the home country and M firms in the foreign country.
Then a domestic firm i would have the following marginal cost function depending on domestic26
competition, and focus on strategic trade policy. However, it would not be
equilibrium for the government to perfectly allow its national firm to copy the
outcome of the rival’s R&D activities  ( ) 1 = q  because loose enforcement will
hurt its national firm’s incentive to invest in R&D activities. Rather, under the
weak enforcement regime each firm will try to free ride on the rival’s R&D
outcome. Thus the Nash equilibrium enforcement level requires balancing these
two effects.
Is the Nash policy set internationally efficient, then? By analyzing the
slopes of each country’s iso-welfare contour, one can show the following:
Proposition 1 (Inefficiency of Nash Equilibrium)
Nash equilibrium enforcement levels and R&D subsidy rates  ( )
N N N N s s * , , * ,q q  are
inefficient.
Proof. See Appendix A. n
There are two sources of the global inefficiency in the absence of any
binding agreements: (1) public-good nature of R&D investment, and (2) a
                                                                                                                                                 






i q q a . Under the
circumstances, each exporting country will enforce more strongly patent protection to boost the
domestic competition.27
general form of the prisoners’ dilemma on R&D subsidization due to strategic
externalities. As we have discussed before, R&D outcome often has the
characteristics of a public good: its stock does not diminish with its
consumption; the marginal cost of disseminating the outcome is almost zero.
For this reason, each exporting country has a strong incentive to free ride on the
rival’s R&D investment, and hence it leads to the global inefficiency.
On the other hand, the Nash equilibrium forms the prisoners’ dilemma
problem on R&D subsidization that has arisen as in the SB model. As we have
discussed in the previous section, while each exporting country has an incentive
to subsidize its domestic R&D as Spencer and Brander (1983) showed, both
countries will be worse off in case of two active governments than in case of free
trade. The active intervention forming the  strategic externalities distorts the
global efficiency. We will check in the next section how we could achieve Pareto
improvement through any international agreement.
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III.  The Agreement on Subsidies and the TRIPS
Agreement
Now we are ready to analyze international agreements on these trade
policy instruments: R&D subsidies and IPR policy. Before analyzing this issue,
we will discuss what the WTO requires member countries in the multinational
framework. Through the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
the WTO strictly prohibits any type of subsidies on exports, but allows R&D
subsidies. Even though R&D subsidies are allowed, however, this Agreement
sets upper bounds of R&D subsidies both on industrial research (75%) and on
pre-competitive development activity (50%). The TRIPS Agreement under the
WTO requires member countries to strongly enforce patent protection
enforcement. Thus the agreement makes it possible to harmonize patent laws
and patent protection enforcement.
Prior to exploring policy choices under the WTO, we first provide a brief
discussion of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and the
TRIPS Agreement.
A. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures29
Governments set industrial policies that affect the allocation of resources
in an economy and the distribution of income. These actions may have an
impact on the pattern of international trade, and hence may give rise to disputes
between countries. Based on the fact above, those policies have been one of
major issues in multilateral negotiations such as the Uruguay Round. Before the
WTO, the issues of subsidization and countries’ response to subsidization
(countervailing measures) are handled under two separate GATT Articles: XVI
and VI. Article XVI deals with subsidy practices while Article VI concentrates on
the domestic legal remedy to those practices: Countervailing Duty Law.
Subsidies that are provided by governments directly for exports have always
been prohibited in the GATT, although until the Uruguay Round and the
formation of the WTO there have been very large exceptions to this prohibition.
After 7 years of discussion under the Uruguay Round, the WTO prohibits any
kind of export subsidies (Article 3.1-a). Subsidies are a difficult problem. While
it is clear that some production subsidies can adversely affect producers in other
countries, there exist several reasons why some subsidies are a means of
achieving various objectives, for instance, promoting growth of an infant
industry. After dealing with this ambiguity by analyzing and classifying
subsidies, the WTO allows subsidies of (1) R&D (Article 8.2-a), (2) regional30
development (Article 8.2-b), and (3) environmental protection (Article 8.2-c).10
Our discussion will focus on R&D subsidies. Even though allowed, the R&D
subsidies have upper limits: each country can pay up to 75% of the costs of
industrial research or 50% of the costs of pre-competitive development activity
(Article 8.2-a). This agreement was greatly based on a change in administration
in the US. Under President Bush, the US position had been that all subsidies
were harmful and must be eliminated. However, Clinton’s team took a more
activist approach to government and believed that industry and the economy
could be assisted by selective government intervention. Thus this upper bound
setting is  partly compatible with the Bush administration’s viewpoint, even
though the allowance is mostly based on the Clinton team’s viewpoint. Given
the fact that a key principle embodied in the WTO is  fair competition, the
allowance of government subsidization on R&D activities are believed not to do
harm this key principle.
B. The TRIPS Agreement
                                                
10  Three categories of subsidy are distinguished under the WTO rules: non-actionable,
prohibited, and actionable. R&D subsidies are non-actionable. Non-actionable subsidies are
legal and may not be countervailed. See Hoekman and Kostecki (1995) and Deardorff (1996) for
more details.31
Being effective as of January 1995, the TRIPS Agreement is the first
example of successful harmonization of policies under GATT auspices, focusing
on intellectual property.11 The fundamental rules on national treatment (NT)
and most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment of foreign nationals are common to
all categories of intellectual property covered by the Agreement. These
obligations cover not only the substantive standards of protection but also
matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance, and
enforcement of IPRs. The general goals of the TRIPS Agreement include the
reduction of distortions and impediments to international trade, promotion of
effective and adequate IPR protection, and ensuring that measures and
procedures to enforce IPR protection do not themselves become barriers to
legitimate trade. The TRIPS Agreement is unique in the WTO context where it
imposes obligations upon governments to pursue specific, similar policies. This
is in stark contrast with the GATS and the GATT, which consist of agreements
not to use specific policies. Thus the TRIPS Agreement is the first example of
successful harmonization of policies under GATT auspices.
                                                
11 The areas of intellectual property that TRIPS Agreement covers are: (i) copyright and
related rights (i.e. the rights of performers, producers of sound recordings and broadcasting
organizations); (ii) trademarks including service marks; (iii) geographical indications including
appellations of origin; (iv) industrial designs; (v) patents including the protection of new
varieties of plants; (vi) the layout-designs of integrated circuits; and (vii) undisclosed
information including trade secrets and test data. See Article 1.2 of TRIPS Agreement.32
Patents:12 In respect of each of the main areas of IPR covered by the TRIPS
Agreement, the Agreement sets out the minimum standards of protection to be
protected by each member. As we’ve discussed before, it requires member
countries to make patents available for any inventions in all fields of technology
without discrimination. It is also required that patents be available and patent
rights enjoyable for 20 years without discrimination as to the place of invention
and whether products are imported or locally produced (Article 27.1). The
exclusive rights that must be conferred by a product patent are defined as the
ones of making, using, offering for sale, selling, and importing for these
purposes. Additionally, process patent protection must give rights not only over
use of the process but also over products obtained directly by the process. Patent
owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent
and to conclude licensing contracts (Article 28). The term of protection available
shall not end before the expiration of a period of 20 years counted from the
filing date (Article 33). This twenty-year lower limit implies harmonization
towards the standards maintained by industrialized countries.
Enforcement of IPRs: The provisions on enforcement are contained in Part
III of the Agreement. These provisions have two basic objectives. One is to
                                                
12 See my previous work, Patent Protection and Strategic Trade Policy, for a general
discussion of patents.33
ensure that effective means of enforcement are available to right holders. The
second is to ensure that enforcement procedures are applied in such a manner
as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for
safeguards against their abuse. General obligations that all enforcement
procedures must meet are notably aimed at ensuring their effectiveness. Such
procedures must be fair and equitable, and they may not be unnecessarily
complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time limits or unwarranted delays
(Article 41.2).
IV. Trade Policy Mix under the WTO
Now let us consider the main questions that we proposed in this paper:
Why do governments seek restrictions on IPR policy and allow R&D subsidies?
To answer this question, we first consider global optimization where both
exporting countries are assumed to set trade policies to maximize worldwide
welfare. Then we will check whether or not results of the global optimization
are compatible with the current WTO requirements on IPR policy and subsidies.
After analyzing the global optimization, we will then consider other
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alternatives to understand why governments seek restrictions on IPR policy and
agree to allow R&D subsidies.
A. Global Welfare Maximization
First consider a global optimization problem in which each country sets
the trade policy tools cooperatively to maximize worldwide welfare. Then we
will check how results of this optimization problem support those agreements
on subsidies and protection of TRIPS. The game based on this consideration is
then given as follows:
The game for Global Optimum
(Stage I) Governments: (1) Patent protection enforcement level and
  (2) R&D subsidy rate
(Stage II) Firms:  R&D levels
(Stage III)  Firms:  Output levels
Since this model has two exporting countries and the third importing
country, the worldwide welfare consists of 3 components: (1) the home
country’s net welfare, (2) the foreign country’s net welfare, and (3) consumer35
surplus of the third importing country. The third component not only
represents the importing country’s welfare but also is compatible with a
viewpoint of Deardorff (1992b). As Deardorff has pointed out, a key reason for
providing patent protection is to permit inventors to earn a return on their
inventions, and therefore to provide an incentive for technology to advance.
However, the cost of providing patent protection is that it permits the patent-
holder to exercise monopoly power over the market for the new product, and
this prevents the benefits of the new product from being enjoyed optimally by
consumers. For this reason, the global optimum considers the consumer surplus
of the third importing country as one component of the global welfare.
Since the importing country is the only place that consumption occurs in
this model, the consumer surplus represents this importing country’s welfare:
(14) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] s * q s q s p dt t p s CS






where (E) represents the equilibrium levels and p(t) is an inverse demand
function for the final good. The maximization problem is given as follows:
(P2)
* , *, , max
q q s s   ( ) ( ) ( ) * , *, , * , *, , * * , *, , q q q q q q s s CS s s W s s W + +
subject to  1 0 £ £q  and  1 0 £ £ * q .36
Using the theorem of Kuhn-Tucker with inequality constraints, we define the
following Lagrangean:
(15) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) * * * , *, , * * , *, , q l q l q l q l q q q q - + + - + + + ” 1 1 s s W s s W L 4 3 2 1 ,
where l1, l2, l3 and l4 are multipliers. The first-order conditions are given as
follows:
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This result of the global optimization expects that both exporting countries will
agree to subsidize R&D activities but to eliminate IPR protection. Since no
protection on IPRs hurts firms’ incentive to engage in R&D activities, R&D
subsidies are then required to maintain appropriate incentives for firms to
engage in R&D investments. Then why do governments agree to eliminate IPR
protection and to perfectly share R&D outcome? This result is difficult to
understand, but intuition is given as follows: From (B3), there are two channels
in which IPR policy can affect global welfare in both direct and indirect ways.
First, by setting IPR policy as well as R&D subsidies each exporting country
alters strategic relationship between firms’ R&D investment levels, and in turn
affects firms’ incentive to engage in R&D investments. Through this R&D
channel, IPR policies over countries affect global welfare. Second, IPR policy
directly affects global welfare by altering output levels and marginal costs as  q G
                                                
13  See Appendix B for calculation. We leave most of the mathematical details to the
appendices, and concentrate on the general story.38
and 
*
q G  in (B3). This direct channel does not consider the R&D incentives or the
R&D free riding, but it includes changes in output and marginal cost due to
changes in IPR policies. Plugging the globally optimal R&D subsidy rates into
(B3) and having (B4), we conclude that R&D subsidies cancel off the R&D
channel in which IPR policies indirectly affects global welfare. Even though
0 G > q ,  0 G <
*
q ,  0 q > q  and  0 q <
*
q , we can show that  0 G G > +
*
q q  and  0 q q > +
*
q q
implying that the first order condition is positive and the solution is a corner
one with  1 = q .14
Then how are the results of the global optimum compatible with the
current WTO requirements on IPR policy and R&D subsidies? First, this result
verifies that the WTO allows R&D subsidies. At the global equilibrium, R&D
subsidies are required to maintain appropriate incentives for firms to engage in
R&D investments. In principle, subsidies are justified because of distortions
created by market failures or other government policies. In our case, the R&D
subsidization is required because the other government policy, IPR protection,
distorts firms’ incentive to engage in R&D investments. However, elimination
of IPR protection is not compatible with the WTO requirements on IPR policy
since the WTO requires member countries to strongly enforce IPR protection
through the TRIPS Agreement. As a consequence, it turns out that the TRIPS
                                                
14  See Appendix B for details.39
Agreement is not an outcome of global optimization where countries are
supposed to set IPR policy in order to maximize worldwide welfare. We have
understood the TRIPS Agreement as a means of providing a proper incentive to
inventors to engage in R&D activities, but it turns out that the TRIPS Agreement
cannot be understood within the simple framework of the R&D investment
incentives. The reason is that in the existence of R&D subsidization, the globally
optimal R&D investment level can be achieved using this trade policy
instrument, R&D subsidy. R&D subsidies have already considered both the R&D
incentives and the R&D free rider problem and hence the globally optimal R&D
investment level can be achieved through R&D subsidization. In the sense above,
the TRIPS Agreement can be understood as an inefficient outcome in our
framework. The main result of the global optimum is summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Global Optimum)
The R&D subsidization is required to maintain appropriate incentives for firms to
engage in R&D activities. However, the TRIPS Agreement is not an outcome of the
global optimization when we consider R&D subsidies and IPR policy in tandem. Since
the globally efficient R&D investment level can be achieved through R&D subsidization,
                                                                                                                                                 40
the TRIPS Agreement can be understood as an inefficient outcome of the multilateral
negotiations.
Then how can we understand why the TRIPS Agreement requires
member countries to strongly enforce IPR protection? In the next subsection we
propose an alternative to provide an answer to this question. We consider a
framework where both exporting countries cooperate over IPR policy to
maximize the joint welfare rather than the global welfare in the absence of R&D
subsidies.
B. The Joint Optimum among Exporting Countries in the
Absence of R&D Subsidization
Now suppose that R&D subsidies are not available in the sense that
countries are unaware or ignore the interdependence between R&D subsidies
and IPR policy. Both exporting countries are assumed to cooperate over IPR41
policy in order to maximize the joint welfare of the exporting countries.15 Then
the optimization problem is given as follows:
(P3)
* , max
q q   ( ) ( ) * , * * , q q q q W W +
subject to  1 0 £ £q  and  1 0 £ £ * q .
Plugging zero into R&D subsidies in the first order conditions of the previous
optimization problem and ignoring the consumer surplus part, we can calculate
the right conditions to this optimization with IPR policy as follows:
(24) 0 G z G G z G 2 1 z z = - + + + + l l q q q q
* * *
* .
This condition is different from (B4), the condition of the global optimization
problem with the trade policy mix. As we have discussed before, there are two
channels that IPR policy could affect welfare: (1) the R&D channel in which IPR
policy indirectly affects the joint welfare considering the R&D incentives and
the R&D free rider problem; and (2) the direct channel in which IPR policy
                                                
15  In the previous version of this paper, I considered the global optimization where both
countries cooperatively set IPR policy to maximize the worldwide welfare. However, the result
was ambiguous and hence we focus on the joint optimization problem to make a stronger
argument.42
directly affects considering changes in output levels and marginal costs. It
implies that in the absence of R&D subsidies, the jointly optimal IPR policy must
consider those channels and balance the R&D investment trade-off between
R&D investment incentives and the free rider problem that occurs in this R&D
game. Then the optimal IPR policy is:













When exporting countries cooperate over IPR policy to maximize their welfare
in the absence of R&D subsidies, they will agree to enforce IPR protection more
strongly than the globally optimal level. In  my  previous  work, we have
discussed the joint optimum where exporting countries cooperate over the trade
policy mix: R&D subsidies and IPR policy. The above result is different from that
of the previous  work because at the joint optimum in the previous work
exporting countries will agree to subsidize R&D activities but to eliminate IPR
protection and hence perfectly share R&D outcome:  1 = q .17 This was not
                                                
16  See Appendix C.
17  See Proposition 2 and Appendix B in  my previous work,  Patent Infringement and
Strategic Trade Policies.43
compatible with the current WTO requirement on IPR protection, either.
However, when both exporting countries cooperate over IPR policy in the
absence of R&D subsidies, they will agree to more strongly enforce IPR
protection than the globally optimal level and the jointly optimal level in the
previous work, Patent Infringement and Strategic Trade Policies.
It would imply that it is possible to understand the TRIPS Agreement as
representing an inefficient victory of the interests of Northern (exporting)
countries over the interests of Southern (importing) countries by demanding
stronger enforcement on IPR protection. This result is based on two things: (1)
Unawareness or ignorance of the interdependence between R&D subsidies and
IPR policy and (2) Exporting countries’ cooperation. When we consider R&D
subsidies and IPR policy in tandem, exporting countries would agree to
eliminate IPR protection and then to subsidize R&D activities in order to
maintain appropriate incentives for firms to engage in R&D investments:  0 s >
and  1 = q . However, both exporting countries will agree to enforce IPR
protection more strongly than the globally optimal level in the absence of R&D
subsidies. It implies that exporting countries would be better off at the joint
optimum in the existence of both trade policy tools – R&D subsidies and IPR
policy - than at the joint optimum in the absence of R&D subsidies. In other
words, the joint optimum in the absence of R&D subsidies is not globally44
efficient and there is a way for exporting countries to be better off by allowing
R&D subsidies. The reason is that we can think of the joint optimum in the
absence of R&D subsidies as a sub-optimal policy set of  ( ) ( ) 1 l 0 s , , ˛ = q  in the
previous optimization problem, where  l is the critical point of the strategic
externality. This set provides lower welfare for exporting countries than the
jointly optimal trade policy set in the existence of both trade policy tools:
( ) 1 0 s = > q , . Due to unawareness or ignorance of the interdependence between
R&D subsidies and IPR policy, both exporting countries could be worse off.
In addition, while the world as a whole benefits from weaker
enforcement of IPR protection it is possible that stronger enforcement would be
attractive to exporting countries. Weaker enforcement in an exporting country
will damage a foreign rival firm’s incentive to invest in R&D activities. As a
consequence of this negative externality exporting countries experience the
prisoners’ dilemma problem when both countries free ride on the rival firm’s
R&D outcome. This implies that exporting countries may benefit  – at the
expense of importers – from a trade agreement to demand stronger enforcement
on IPR protection. Thus it is possible to understand the TRIPS Agreement as an
inefficient victory of the interests of northern countries over the interests of
southern countries. This result is summarized in the following proposition:45
Proposition 3 (The TRIPS Agreement)
The TRIPS Agreement is an inefficient victory of the interests of North countries over
the interests of Southern countries by ignoring the link between R&D subsidies and IPR
policy. This result is based on two things: (1) Unawareness or ignorance of the
interdependence between R&D subsidies and IPR policy and (2) Exporting countries’
cooperation.
The WTO requires member countries to strongly enforce IPR protection
probably because stronger enforcement would protect inventors’ incentives
from the free rider problem. However, we can cure the damaged incentives by
subsidizing the creative activities. Since R&D outcomes have the public good
nature, the free rider problem always exists. From the analysis so far, R&D
subsidization has been justified because of distortion created by market failures
of the public good nature.  In the sense above, the TRIPS Agreement overrides
the issue of the free rider problem in the R&D. This result provides new
implication on the conclusion of Bagwell and Staiger (1999b). Considering a
new proposal of the WTO to include negotiations over labor and environmental
standards, they conclude that there is no need for the WTO to expand the scope
of its negotiations in that way, if the use of those domestic standards is
understood as a secondary trade barrier. The reason is that there is only one46
source of global inefficiency that a trade agreement can cure, given the
understanding of the use of domestic standards in the way above. Since the
current WTO rules are well equipped to handle the problems associated with
choices over labor and environmental standards focusing on the market access,
therefore these rules can achieve globally efficient outcomes with relatively
modest changes. Our result is very similar to that of Bagwell and Staiger (1999b).
Even though R&D activities might provide an additional channel of the global
inefficiency (the public-good nature of R&D activities) because incentives to
invest in R&D can be easily damaged if IPR protection is not perfect, a single
trade policy instrument would be enough to cure the inefficiency. It is
unnecessary to add a trade policy when we understand the link between R&D
subsidies and IPR policy.
V. Conclusion
Why does the WTO allow R&D subsidies through the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures? To answer this question, we considered
the link between R&D subsidies and IPR policy as we have proposed in our
previous work. The Nash equilibrium trade policy set was globally inefficient.47
There are two channels of global inefficiency in the absence of any binding
agreement: (1) public-good nature of R&D activities and (2)  strategic
externalities. At the non-cooperative game, each government has an incentive
to manipulate strategic relationship between firms in an imperfectly
competitive international market, by choosing either R&D subsidies or TRIPS
protection enforcement policy. While the world as a whole benefits from
weaker enforcement on IPR protection by sharing R&D outcome, it is possible
that stronger enforcement would be attractive to exporting countries. Weak
enforcement in an exporting country will hurt a foreign rival firm’s incentive to
invest in R&D activities. As a consequence of this negative externality, exporting
countries experience the prisoners’ dilemma problem when both countries free
ride on the rival firm’s R&D outcome. This implies that exporting countries
may benefit from a trade agreement that demands stronger enforcement on IPR
protection. Thus it is possible to understand the TRIPS Agreement as
representing an inefficient victory of the interests of Northern countries over
the interests of Southern countries. In addition, R&D subsidization can solve the
damaged incentive problem that occurred in the R&D game. Since R&D
activities have public good nature, the free rider problem always exists. To cure
the damaged incentives of inventors, each country must subsidize R&D
activities. In the sense above, the TRIPS Agreement is an unnecessarily48
duplicated restriction on the IPR policy over countries. These results might be
very strong so that readers could feel difficult to find the role of the TRIPS
Agreement in the multilateral negotiation framework. However, during the
Uruguay Round we have faced a lot of issue linkages related to this topic, TRIPS.
For example, some of less-developed countries tried to tighten their domestic
protection of IPRs unilaterally so as to attract foreign direct investment and
technology from high-tech countries. Or in exchange for progress on TRIPS poor
nations and transition economies could seek more open markets for their
agricultural products and better market access for their textile exports.
Therefore many issues are linked each other including TRIPS and R&D subsidies,
and we leave this issue linkage for future research.49
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Plugging first-order conditions of the non-cooperative Nash setup into
those of the global optimum, (16) – (19), we can show that Nash equilibrium




* q q , the Nash
policy set doesn’t satisfy the first-order conditions of the global optimization:
(A1) 0 CS W s s „ +
* ;
(A2) 0 CS W s s „ + * * ;
(A3) 0 CS W „ + q q
* ;
(A4) 0 CS W „ + * * q q .
Appendix B:  Global Optimum50
First using a derivative of an integral, one can show the derivative of consumer
surplus with respect to the subsidy:
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Plugging (B1) into (16) and using (17), we can show the optimal subsidy rate
over countries as follows:
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The signs of optimal R&D subsidies depend on IPR policy over home and
foreign countries. To calculate optimal IPR policy, we can rewrite (16) as
follows:
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Plugging optimal R&D subsidy rates from (B2), we can rewrite (B3) again as
follows:
















Checking the corner solutions for IPR policy, we can conclude that the
worldwide-welfare maximizing IPR policy is no protection:  1
G G = =
* q q . These
IPR policies over countries determine the signs of optimal R&D subsidies. Since
there is a positive externality in the R&D game due to no protection on TRIPS,
we can conclude  0 Gz > * . Then we conclude in turn that optimal R&D subsidies
are positive.52
Appendix C: The Joint Optimum in the Absence of R&D
Subsidization
Case 1:  0 = q .
Then the slackness condition implies that  0 2 = l  and  0 1 ‡ l . Using these results,
we can rewrite (24) as follows:
(C1)
* * *
* q q q q l G G z G z G z z 1 - - - - = .
Checking signs of components when  0 = q , we can show that l1 is negative. It
violates the slackness condition, which means that it has a contradiction.
Case 2:  1 = q .
Then the slackness condition implies that  0 1 = l  and  0 2 ‡ l . Using these results,
we can rewrite (24) as follows:
(C2)
* * *
* q q q q l G G z G z G z z 2 + + + = .53
Checking signs of components when  1 = q , we can show that the sign of l2 is
ambiguous because  0 Gz > * ,  0 Gz >
* ,  0 z z < + q q
* , and  0 G G > +
*
q q .
Case 3:  1 0 < <q .
Then the slackness condition implies that  0 2 1 = = l l . Using this result, we can
rewrite (24) as follows:
(C3) 0 G G z G z G z z = + + +
* * *
* q q q q .
Since  0 z z < + q q
*  and  0 G G > +
*
q q , we can conclude that  * z G  and 
*
z G  must be
positive to satisfy (C3). According to Appendix 2-A, the optimal IPR policy will
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놹릮뿤뻠
못 돭릮뾡벭듂 R&D 몸솶뇝냺  쇶샻 샧믪뇇뾡  듫쟑 놹솦샻  릫뾪  쟹솤뗩샇
샌럐샻 뇙냅뢦 뫐벮쟑듙.  WTO 샇  ‘몸솶뇝 맗 믳볢솶쒡뾡  듫쟑 쟹솤’뾡  뗻뢣룩
볶쏢 몸솶뇝삺 뇝쇶뗇뻺쇶뢸, R&D 몸솶뇝삺 쟣뿫뗇냭 샖듙. 뛇쟑 ‘쇶샻 샧믪뇇뾡
듫쟑  쟹솤’삻  엫쟘 WTO 듂  좸뿸놹뗩뾡냔  쇶샻  샧믪뇇삻  낭럂죷  몸좣쟒  냍삻
뿤놸쟏냭 샖듙. 볶쏢 몸솶뇝샇 뇝쇶듂 WTO 뇢못 뿸뢮 쇟 쟏뎪샎 ‘냸솤냦샯’삸럎
벳룭뗉  볶  샖삸뎪 R&D  몸솶뇝샇  쟣뿫삺  뇢솸샇  뾬놸  냡냺뾡  뇙냅쟘벭  몼  뚧
샌쟘쟏뇢  뻮럁뿮  릮솦샌듙. 뇗  샌삯듂  뾩랯  놹낡낡  떿뷃뾡  샚놹  뇢뻷뾡냔 R&D
몸솶뇝삻  쇶뇞쟏듂  냦뿬  샏망샻삸럎 Prisoner’s dilemma 샇  릮솦낡  맟믽쟏뇢
뚧릮샌듙. 쇶샻 샧믪뇇 몸좣 릮솦뿍 R&D 몸솶뇝 릮솦뢦 떿뷃뾡 냭럁쟒 냦뿬 R&D
몸솶뇝샇  쟣뿫삺  붱냔  샌쟘뗉  볶  샖듙. 쇶샻  샧믪뇇샇  뫒뿏샼쟑  몸좣낡  솤뫎럎
쟏뾩뇝  샚놹  뇢뻷뗩뾡냔 R&D  몸솶뇝삻  쇶뫒쟒  삯샎삻  솦냸쟑듙.  뇗랯뎪,  못
돭릮샇 뫐벮 냡냺, 쇶샻 샧믪뇇삻 몸좣쟏쇶 뻊냭 룰뗧 뇢뻷샌 R&D 엵샚럎 웄믽뗈
쇶뷄삻 냸삯쟏룧  샌럎 샎쟑 R&D엵샚삯샎샇  남볒뢦 R&D 몸솶뇝삸럎  쏦듧쟏듂
냍샌  샼벼냨샇  죄믽삻  뇘듫좭쟏듂  쏖샻  솤쎥샎  냍삸럎  뎪언뎵듙.  샌듂  쟶샧59
WTO 낡  뿤놸쟏듂  ‘쇶샻  샧믪뇇뾡  듫쟑  쟹솤’냺  맨쒡뗇듂  냡냺샌룧  샌  쟹솤삺
볶쏢놹낡샇 죄믽삻 듫몯쟏듂 냍삸럎 뫐벮뗈듙.